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Polygon Hard Fork Proposal Targets 70.49 Million POL Stolen in Binance, Polymarket Hacks
Network Upgrade Would Return Frozen Funds to Verified Recovery Wallets
TL;DR
- Polygon is considering a hard fork to recover approximately 70.49 million POL, worth $6.5 million, stolen in separate Polymarket and Binance incidents.
- The proposal would transfer restricted funds from attacker-controlled addresses to verified recovery wallets without creating new POL tokens.
- The plan requires governance approval, network testing and validator support, with other stolen tokens excluded from recovery.
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Polygon is considering a hard fork of its proof-of-stake (PoS) blockchain to recover approximately 70.49 million POL, valued at roughly $6.5 million, stolen in separate security incidents involving Polymarket and Binance on October 29 and 30, 2026.
A member of the Polygon Labs Validator Support Team submitted a Polygon Improvement Proposal (PIP) that would move the stolen tokens from attacker-controlled addresses to recovery wallets designated by the affected platforms. The funds are currently restricted from moving, but their return would require a coordinated network upgrade.
How Polygon Plans to Recover the Stolen POL
The proposal targets stolen balances associated with the two incidents, with the affected POL distributed across five addresses. Polygon's proposed intervention would cover the following amounts:
During the Polymarket-related incident, two malicious transfers moved a combined 3,282,275.71 POL between addresses. Following requests from Polymarket and Binance, all validator-elected block producers on Polygon added the identified addresses to their Bor transaction block lists, preventing the restricted funds from moving through the blocked transaction paths.
Polygon described the block-list arrangement as a temporary safeguard rather than a permanent recovery mechanism. The lists are read when block producers start up, meaning updates require deployment and either a Bor restart or span rotation. The filtering system also leaves room for potential bypass attempts because it does not cover every possible transaction path. Although the restrictions have prevented the identified balances from moving, they do not provide a way to return the funds to their owners.
Polygon also identified an attempted transaction involving a fee of approximately 219,450 POL. Separately, the attacker allegedly approached validators with offers of cash payments in exchange for assistance removing transaction restrictions. These incidents were among the concerns raised as Polygon considered replacing the existing block-list safeguards with a more permanent recovery measure.
Under the proposed hard fork, Polygon would set the balances of the identified attacker-controlled addresses to zero at a predetermined block height and credit the corresponding amounts to recovery wallets. Polymarket and Binance would each need to prove control of their designated recovery addresses and confirm in writing that they are authorized to receive the funds.
The transfer would reassign existing balances rather than create replacement tokens. The proposal explicitly maintains the existing POL supply, with no additional tokens minted as part of the recovery operation.
Recovery Proposal Excludes Other Tokens and Requires Validator Approval
The proposed intervention applies only to native POL held at the identified addresses. Other digital assets are excluded, including USDT stolen in the Binance incident. Tether has already frozen the affected USDT, and the Polygon hard fork would leave those tokens untouched.
Polygon characterized the proposed recovery as an exceptional measure tied to publicly acknowledged thefts and traceable funds. The proposal also cautions against treating such interventions as routine transaction reversals or establishing a general mechanism for freezing and recovering user assets.
The proposal was scheduled for discussion during the Polygon Protocol Governance Call on November 5. Before implementation on the Polygon PoS mainnet, it must pass the governance process, undergo client development and testing on the Amoy testnet, and receive the required validator support.
If approved, developers expect to complete client development and testnet rehearsals within approximately two to three weeks. The proposed balance transfers would then depend on the successful completion of those steps and the coordinated network upgrade.
This article has been refined and enhanced by ChatGPT.
